This objection is perhaps the worst, but since we are cataloguing rather common objections to Kalam, we should toss the following one into the mix. This objection goes something like this: The second premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument seems to put God in a rather difficult place when one considers that the word ‘universe’ means the totality of all that exists. God would be something that exists and so given that the universe began to exist [or all that exists began to exist], God too would begin to exist... Read The Rest →
The existence of decision making seems to imply some change, and thus temporality. How can God decide to create explanatorily prior to the existence of time? First we must answer what it means to decide, and what about it implies temporality. It seems to me that decision making involves the selection of an action from a collection of possible actions. If a decision involves a change of mental states, then temporality is implied by it. Below I will attempt to construct the argument against the Kalam Cosmological Argument that decision making does imply temporality, and thus, it is concluded that God’s did not timelessly decide to bring about some thing x (the universe).