Quentin Smith is not persuaded by this line. He argues by way of a reductio that interpreting the ICS as equivalent to nothing entails (1) the denial of the truth of the Special and General Theory of Relativity, which represents spacetime as a continuum of instantaneous spatial points. Even further, if the ICS, Smith argues, were equivalent with nothing, then (2) the entire spacetime continuum would too be equivalent with nothing, and this is prima facie false. STR and GTR represent events as instantaneous spatial points having zero spatial and... Read The Rest →
Finally here I am breaking the silence of months with yet another Common Objection to Kalam. I’ve heard this objection explicated most often by the youtube Atheist community (a very vibrant community, to be kind). In all of his written works on the Kalam Cosmological Argument, William Lane Craig defends the second premise (i.e. the universe began to exist) philosophically by arguing for the absurdity (read: impossibility) of the existence of an actual infinite. And following this he defends the second premise by way of empirical confirmation utilizing Big Bang cosmology and... Read The Rest →
This objection is perhaps the worst, but since we are cataloguing rather common objections to Kalam, we should toss the following one into the mix. This objection goes something like this: The second premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument seems to put God in a rather difficult place when one considers that the word ‘universe’ means the totality of all that exists. God would be something that exists and so given that the universe began to exist [or all that exists began to exist], God too would begin to exist... Read The Rest →
I’m on a roll this week – I have yet another Common Objection to Kalam. And, this might be tiring by now, our criticism today comes from – you guessed it – Adolf Grünbaum. Now, this objection isn’t as common as the others, but it is no less interspersed throughout the endless grid that is the internet (to think of a Tron reference). Unlike my previous responses, this will not be so short, and not so simple as it were. I will draw almost entirely from the criticisms of Adolf... Read The Rest →
As promised, Part 3 of Common Objections to Kalam is here. I tackle yet another rather common, but no less important, objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument. And like our previous objection, Adolf Grünbaum used this exact objection in his Group 1 objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument in, “The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology.” In it he writes, “it would hardly follow that there is some one single conscious agency which was required causally for the occurrence of the supposed first state of the total physical universe. This... Read The Rest →
Our next Common Objections to Kalam comes spuriously out of the halls of internetdom. While it is popularly used as a response to the Kalām Cosmological Argument, Adolf Grünbaum (the famous philosopher of time) was, to my knowledge, the first fellow to bring up this objection, and in a manner fitting of the internet, before it fell from the high clouds of philosophical journals it was swept up and blasted by powerful critiques; and yet in spite of this, it is still rather popular on the internet and elsewhere.
In leu of the periodical nature of my previous post, I thought I would do something similar with the Kalam Cosmological Argument for God’s existence. Thus, Common Objections to Kalam (COK for short) has been birthed! Like Bedside reading this will be a weekly endeavor, but unlike Bedside reading, I’ll eventually run out of objections, and at a rather quicker rate. Regardless, this week the objection mentioned is easy, nay too easy, but we have to start somewhere, and why not start with one of THE most popular objections to... Read The Rest →
The existence of decision making seems to imply some change, and thus temporality. How can God decide to create explanatorily prior to the existence of time? First we must answer what it means to decide, and what about it implies temporality. It seems to me that decision making involves the selection of an action from a collection of possible actions. If a decision involves a change of mental states, then temporality is implied by it. Below I will attempt to construct the argument against the Kalam Cosmological Argument that decision making does imply temporality, and thus, it is concluded that God’s did not timelessly decide to bring about some thing x (the universe).